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Deportation of Human Rights Abusers:
Towards Achieving Accountability,
Not Fostering Impunity
By SIMONA AGNOLUCCI *
Josef, a Lebanese war criminal and known torturer, fled to the
United States in the 1980s and has since lived with impunity in
Southern California.' A leading international human rights
organization has learned of Josef's presence in the United States and
would like to hold him accountable for his past abuses. Because the
10-year statute of limitations applicable to Alien Tort Claims Act
("ATCA") suits has expired and there may be no possibility for
tolling, bringing a civil suit "against him in the United States could
prove difficult. Josef can be prosecuted for torture committed abroad
pursuant to a domestic criminal law,2 but the United States has used
this law to file torture charges only once.3 Although having Josef
extradited to Europe for trial might be possible, the facts of his
case - the acts he committed, their time frame, and the nationality of
his victims - do not lend themselves to universal jurisdiction under
* Law clerk to the Honorable William C. Canby, Jr., Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
J.D., University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2006. Bachelor of Arts,
Stanford University, 1998. The author would like to thank Naomi Roht-Arriaza,
Lexiuste Cajuste, Moira Feeney, and Elias Batchelder for their guidance, insight, and
support.
1. The facts of this hypothetical are fictional. Any resemblance to real persons
or events is purely coincidental.
2. 18 U.S.C. § 2340A(a) (1994).
3. See The Center for Justice & Accountability, Chuckie Taylor, Son of Liberia's
Charles Taylor, Indicted by U.S. Federal Grand Jury for Torture, available at
<www.cja.org>. Charles "Chuckie" Taylor, Jr., the son of former Liberian warlord
and president Charles Taylor, was indicted on criminal torture charges in December
2006. Taylor's indictment was the first time the U.S. government filed a prosecution
under its criminal torture statute. For a discussion of the United States' reluctance to
prosecute torture, see Coletta Youngers, The Pinochet Ricochet, NATION, May 8,
2000, at 5. Prosecuting Josef could also be problematic because the U.S. law
criminalizing torture was passed in 1994, well after his abuses were committed.
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the statutes of most European countries. The human rights
organization is considering having Josef deported to Lebanon under a
recently enacted U.S. law allowing deportation of individuals who
have committed torture or certain other human rights violations.
However the human rights organization questions whether having
Josef deported is a way of "letting him off easy."
This paper will examine immigration-based accountability
measures for violators of international human rights law. Part I will
examine (1) both recently enacted and recently proposed changes to
United States immigration law allowing for deportation of human
rights violators; and (2) international law provisions relating to the
denial of immigration benefits to human rights abusers. Part II will
discuss Canada's War Crimes Program, which uses immigration law
as part of a larger effort to eradicate and punish human rights
abusers. Part III will examine cases in which human rights abusers
were deported from the United States and will discuss the response of
survivors in the United States and in foreign countries to deportation
of human rights abusers. Part IV will discuss deportation in light of
traditional theories of punishment. Part V will conclude that
deportation alone, particularly in light of the cases discussed in Part
III, does not tend to achieve accountability. This part will offer
criteria or factors to be used in determining the advisability of
deporting human rights abusers, and will suggest strategies for
pursuing deportation, when applicable. Part VI will provide
concluding observations.
I. U.S. Immigration Law and International Law
Congress's power to order the deportation of non-citizens whose
presence in the United States it deems hurtful is well-established.4
Many grounds, including involvement in criminal activity, limit the
right of non-citizens to enter or remain in the United States. For
example, a non-citizen convicted of a crime of moral turpitude is
inadmissible A non-citizen who has been admitted to the United
States may be deported if, inter alia, he has committed certain crimes
6or poses a security threat to the United States.
Over the past 30 years, Congress has amended immigration law
4. Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585,592 (1913).
5. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i).
6. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (West 2005).
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to provide specifically for the inadmissibility and removal of human
rights abusers. In 1978, Congress passed the Holtzman Amendment,
which allows for the deportation of individuals who participated in
Nazi persecution. At the same time, the Justice Department created
the Office of Special Investigations ("OSI") to coordinate
deportation and/or denaturalization proceedings against alleged
former war criminals living in the United States.8 The OSI pursues
Nazis through immigration-based mechanisms but not by means of
criminal prosecution, apparently due to concerns that criminal
prosecutions would raise due process issues.9
In 1990, Congress further amended immigration law to exclude
from the United States "[a]ny alien who has engaged in conduct that
is defined as genocide for purposes of the International Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide."'" In 1997, the
Justice Department created the National Security Unit, the agency
responsible for the investigation of modern-day war crimes, and the
National Security Law Division, which handles cases involving
national security and modern-day human rights abuses." These
agencies collaborate with other branches of the U.S. government,
including the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"). 2
Over the past 10 years, various bills have been introduced in the
House and Senate to provide additional grounds for the deportation
of human rights abusers. Some of these bills aimed to deport
individuals who committed torture. Others sought to impose
immigration restrictions on all "serious human rights abusers,"
including individuals who committed torture, war crimes, and crimes
against humanity.' Some included restrictions on individuals who,
7. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(E)(i).
8. Robert A. Cohen, United States Exclusion and Deportation of Nazi War
Criminals: The Act of October 30, 1978, 13 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 101, 102 (1980).
9. Bruce J. Einhorn et al., The Prosecution of War Criminals and Violators of
Human Rights in the United States, 19 WHIT-FIER L. REV. 281, 284 (1997).
10. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(E)(ii).
11. Amnesty International USA, United States of America: A Safe Haven for
Torturers, app. 3 at 160 (2002), available at <www.amnestyusa.org/stoptorture/
safe-haven.pdf> (visited Mar. 16, 2007).
12. Id. at 156-57.
13. S. 1375: Anti-Atrocity Alien Deportation Act (1999); H.R. 1449: Anti-
Atrocity Alien Deportation Act (2001); S. 864: Anti-Atrocity Alien Deportation Act
of 2002 (2002).
14. H.R. 5285: Serious Human Rights Abusers Accountability Act of 2000
(2000).
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for political, religious, or discriminatory purposes, committed acts
such as homicide, rape, kidnapping, and arbitrary detention.
15
In 2004, Congress passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act ("IRTPA"), which provides for the inadmissibility
and removability of (1) individuals who committed, ordered, incited,
assisted, or otherwise participated in the commission of torture or
extrajudicial killing abroad under color of law; or (2) foreign
government officials who have committed particularly severe
violations of religious freedom.16 The IRTPA requires the Attorney
General to consult with the Secretary of Homeland Security in
determining whether human rights abusers should be prosecuted
criminally or extradited. 7 This determination should take into
consideration "the availability of criminal prosecution under the laws
of the United States" and the availability of extradition of the
individual to a foreign nation that is prepared to prosecute him.'8
The United States' deportation policy is consistent with
international law, under which certain human rights abusers are not
entitled to immigration relief. The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights provides that the right to seek asylum "may not be invoked in
the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from non-political crimes
or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United
Nations."' 9  The Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
prohibits granting refugee status to (1) anyone who committed a
crime against peace, a war crime, a crime against humanity, or a
serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge; or (2)
anyone who has committed acts contrary to the purposes and
15. Human Rights Abusers Act of 2000 (2000). The U.S. Justice Department
proposed the Act at the hearing on the Serious Human Rights Abusers
Accountability Act of 2000. Its text is available at: Hearing on H.R. 5285 Before the
House Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims of the Comm. on the Judiciary, House
of Representatives, 106th Cong. 48 (2000).
16. Pub. L. No. 108-458 (S. 2845) (2004) (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1227(a),
1182(a)). The IRTPA, 8 U.S.C. § 1103(h), also amends the grounds of inadmissibility
or removability of an individual who has committed genocide by adopting the
definition of genocide contained in 18 U.S.C. § 1091(a) (which requires the "specific
intent to destroy, in whole or in substantial part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious
group" (emphasis added)) and by striking the Genocide Convention's definition
(which requires only the "intent to destroy, in whole or in part... .
17. 8 U.S.C. § 1103(h).
18. Id.
19. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR,
3d Sess., at 74, U.N. Doc. A/RES/810 (1948).
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principles of the United Nations° Travaux prdparatoires indicate
that one of the aims of international law restrictions was "to ensure
that those who had committed grave crimes in World War II, other
serious non-political crimes, or who were guilty of acts contrary to the
purposes and principles of the United Nations did not escape
prosecution."2 Despite these restrictions on immigration benefits to
human rights abusers, the principle of non-refoulement prohibits
States from sending an individual to another State when there exist
substantial grounds for believing he will be subjected to torture.2
II. The Canadian Model
In 1987, the Canadian government adopted a policy calling for
deportation and prosecution of Canadian citizens found guilty of war
crimes or crimes against humanity. 3 Canada amended its criminal
code accordingly, allowing for extraterritorial jurisdiction over
perpetrators of war crimes or crimes against humanity if the
individual accused was a Canadian citizen, a citizen of a country at
war with Canada, or if the victim was a Canadian citizen or a citizen
of an ally of Canada. In the first case to reach Canada's Supreme
Court under the revised criminal code, the court overturned the
conviction of Imre Finta, who had been accused of committing war
crimes and crimes against humanity against Hungarian Jews during
the Second World War. 5 The Canadian Supreme Court applied high
thresholds of proof for the actus reus and mens rea elements of war
crimes and crimes against humanity,' creating a "nearly
insurmountable hurdle" for the prosecution. 6 As a result, it became
20. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. iF, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S.
150, as amended by the 1967 Protocol, 606 U.N.T.S. 267; see also 1950 Statute of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees para. 7(d), UNGA Res. 428(V)
Annex, U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 20) 46, UN doc. A/1775 (Dec. 14, 1950).
21. Geoff Gilbert, Current Issues in the Application of the Exclusion Clauses, 2,
paper commissioned by the UNHCR, (2001), available at <www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/
texis/vtx/publ/opendoc.pdf?tbl=PUBL&id=419dba514> (visited Mar. 16, 2007).
22. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, adopted by the General Assembly of the U.N. Dec. 10,
1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (hereinafter "Convention Against Torture").
23. Government of Canada, CANADA'S WAR CRIMES PROGRAM: ANNUAL
REPORT 1999-2000 (2000), available at <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/pub/
war2000.html>.
24. Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 7(3.71) (1985).
25. R. v. Finta, S.C.R. 701 (1994).
26. Beth Van Schaack, In Defense of Civil Redress: The Domestic Enforcement of
Human Rights Norms in the Context of the Proposed Hague Judgments Convention,
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clear to the Canadian government "that it would be impractical to
prosecute further cases under the (then) existing provisions of the
Criminal Code.,
27
In response to these difficulties, the Canadian government
announced in 1995 that instead of focusing on prosecuting human
rights abusers, it would seek to denaturalize and/or deport them.'
The government's policy shift sought "to ensure that World War II
war crimes and crimes against humanity, regardless of time and place,
are addressed., 29 In 1997, Canada amended its immigration laws in
furtherance of this policy shift.3" As a result, an individual will not be
admitted to Canada if immigration officials find (1) reasonable
grounds to believe he has committed or been complicit in war crimes;
(2) reasonable grounds to believe he has committed or been complicit
in crimes against humanity; or (3) that he served as a senior official
under a regime engaged in systematic and gross human rights
violations or crimes against humanity.31
Since 1995, Canada has invested considerable resources towards
the detection, deterrence, and removal of war criminals.32 Canada's
deportation policy constitutes part of. a larger War Crimes Program
that aims to use "the most appropriate of six complementary tools:
extradition, transfer to the international tribunals, denial of refugee
protection, deportation and denaturalization proceedings, denial of
access to Canada, and domestic criminal prosecutions. 33 Canada's
Minister of Justice and Minister of Citizenship and Immigration
42 HARV. INT'L L.J. 141,148 (2001).
27. CANADAS WAR CRIMES PROGRAM: ANNUAL REPORT 1999-2000, supra note 23.
28. Canadian Dep't of Justice, Press Release, Federal Government Announces
WWII Crimes Strategy (Jan. 31, 1995).
29. Id.
30. CANADA'S WAR CRIMES PROGRAM: ANNUAL REPORT 1999-2000, supra note 23.
31. Government of Canada, CANADA'S WAR CRIMES PROGRAM: ANNUAL
REPORT 1998-1999 (1999), available at <www.cic.gc.ca/english/pub/war1999.html>
(visited Mar. 16, 2007) (The Bosnian Serb regime, the Siad Barrd regime in Somalia,
the former military governments in Haiti, the former Marxist regimes of Afghanistan,
the governments of Ahmed Hassan Al-Bakr and Saddam Hussein, the government of
Rwanda under President Habyarimana, the interim government in power in Rwanda
between April 1994 and July 1994, and the governments of Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia (Milosevic) have been designated as regimes
engaged in systematic and gross human rights violations or crimes against humanity).
32. Canada is Strengthening its Approach to Bringing War Criminals to Justice,
CANADA NEWSWIRE, July 21, 1998.
33. CANADA'S WAR CRIMES PROGRAM: ANNUAL REPORT 1998-1999, supra note 31.
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produce an annual public report on Canada's War Crimes Program.'
The War Crimes Program provides the Department of Justice
("DOJ") with millions of dollars each year to litigate cases against
Nazi war criminals and modern-day human rights abusers. The
DOJ's investigative team, located in Ottawa, employs historians,
attorneys, and linguists, and collaborates with regional counsel and
contract historians. The team works with foreign governments to
obtain evidence and interview witnesses. The ultimate aim is to
determine whether a civil (immigration-based) or criminal proceeding
is warranted and to oversee the implementation of the appropriate
proceedings.
Furthermore, the War Crimes Program allots millions of dollars
per year to the Department of Citizenship and Immigration ("CIC")
to prevent suspected war criminals from reaching Canada by refusing
them overseas, excluding them from the refugee claims process, and
removing them from Canada if they have already entered the
country. The program trains immigration officers in international
human rights law and evidentiary standards.
Finally, the War Crimes Program allots funding to the Royal
Canadian Mounted Police to respond to allegations of war crimes and
crimes against humanity reported by the general public, and by local
and foreign government officials. The program also funds additional
investigations requested by the DOJ and CIC.
The War Crimes Program has appointed an Operations
Committee to serve as a liaison among its participating agencies. The
Operations Committee meets approximately every four weeks to
review and discuss case strategies, program development, the nature
of cooperation with international tribunals, litigation strategy, and
other areas of mutual concern. The Committee also analyzes
Canada's method of proceeding with modern-day war crimes cases to
ensure the satisfaction of international obligations regarding
prosecution or extradition before the initiation of deportation
proceedings. 5
Furthermore, the Canadian government, in collaboration with
the United Nations, played a significant role in the establishment of
the international tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia,
and advocated for the establishment of the International Criminal
34. Id.
35. The facts in the previous four paragraphs were all taken from CANADA'S
WAR CRIMES PROGRAM: ANNUAL REPORT 1998-1999, supra note 31.
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Court ("ICC").16  Canada passed an Extradition Act to assist
extradition of human rights abusers to international tribunals, and to
facilitate extradition of perpetrators to countries that have different
rules of evidence while providing for procedural and human rights
safeguards for the suspected perpetrators.37  The Canadian
government also engages in outreach events to foster understanding
of its policies, targeting like-minded states, non-governmental
organizations ("NGOs"), international organizations, academics, and
educational institutions.38 Special Canadian Minister of Justice and
Attorney General Anne McLellan believes that these coordinated,
government-wide efforts make clear that "Canada is not a safe haven
for war criminals" and strengthen Canada's "ability to bring those
responsible for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other
reprehensible acts in times of war, to justice. '"" In 2002, Canada's
War Crimes Program investigated 3,983 cases, refused entry to 941
individuals, and removed 46 individuals from the country.'
In contrast, the U.S. investigative agency devoted to the
detection of human rights abusers prior to the passage of the IRTPA
announced the investigation of only 200 cases in 2004.4' As of 2003,
only 57 individuals had been deported for participation in Nazi war
crimes since the 1978 passage of the Holtzman amendment. Many
of the alleged human rights abusers deported from the United States
faced charges for immigration violations such as overstaying their
visas or for having misrepresented their criminal status upon entry to
the United States.43  Their alleged participation in human rights
36. Canada is Strengthening its Approach to Bringing War Criminals to Justice,
supra note 32.
37. Id.
38. CANADA'S WAR CRIMES PROGRAM: ANNUAL REPORT 1999-2000, supra note 23.
39. Canada is Strengthening its Approach to Bringing War Criminals to Justice,
supra note 32.
40. CANADA'S WAR CRIMES PROGRAM: ANNUAL REPORT 2001-2002 app. 1
(2002), available at <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/pub/war2002/sectionl5.html>
(visited Mar. 16, 2007).
41. Report of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Office of
Investigations: Smuggling/Public Safety Division (Oct. 12, 2005), available at
<www.ice.gov/graphics/investigations/publicsafety/humanrights.htm> and on file with
the author.
42. Former WWII Death Camp Nazi-SS Guard Arrested: Fugitive Belonged to
Germany's Infamous "Death's Head Battalion," News Release, U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (July 3, 2003), available at <www.ice.gov/pi/news/
newsreleases/articles/nazifugitive070303.htm>.
43. United States of America: A Safe Haven for Torturers, supra note 11, at 23-6.
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abuses, therefore, was minimized.
The passage of the IRTPA, however, has the potential to change
the United States' use of immigration-based accountability measures
for human rights abusers. In 2005, authorities brought charges
against the first non-citizen ever to be put in deportation proceedings
because of his participation in genocide." Last year, United States
Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") announced the
creation of two new units to target human rights violators: the Human
Rights Violators and Public Safety Unit ("HRVPSU") and the
Human Rights Law Division ("HRLD"). The HRVPSU and the
HRDL have identified over 800 cases involving suspected human
rights violators and have announced their commitment to criminally
prosecute human rights violators to the fullest extent of the law.45
The announced changes in domestic policy with respect to human
rights abusers may bring the United States' previously limited
approach more in line with the comprehensive and relatively effective
Canadian model.
The United States previously has sought the assistance of NGOs
in deporting human rights abusers.' Because the United States'
human rights offender programs enjoy limited resources compared to
their Canadian counterparts, 7 the collaboration of NGOs may prove
instrumental in the development of deportation cases under the
IRTPA. NGOs filing civil suits on behalf of the survivors of human
rights abuses or assisting refugees with political asylum applications
may have access to witnesses and evidence that would greatly assist
ICE in pursuing prosecution of alleged human rights abusers.
Through case studies and an analysis of whether and to what extent
deportation satisfies the objectives of criminal punishment, the
remainder of this paper will develop a framework for NGOs and ICE
44. Human Rights Violators Investigations, Fact Sheet of the United States
Customs and Immigration Enforcement (Dec. 5, 2006) <www.ice.gov/pi/news/
factsheets/hrvcl.htm>
45. Id.
46. See The Center for Justice and Accountability, Projects: Deportations,
available at <www.cja.org/projects/projects.shtml#Deportations> (visited Mar. 16,
2007); see also Report of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, supra note 41.
47. For example, the United States allotted approximately $3 million a year to
the OSI, the unit formerly responsible for investigation and deportation of human
rights abusers, while Canada's War Crimes Program receives approximately $15
million per year. William Aceves & Paul Hoffman, Using Immigration Law to
Protect Human Rights: A Critique of Recent Legislative Proposals, 23 MICH. J. INT'L
LAW 733, 765 n.185 (2002).
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to work alongside each other in bringing human rights violators to
justice.
Il. Case Studies
This paper will examine three cases in which human rights
abusers residing in the United States were deported. In two of these
cases, courts eventually freed the offenders, but civil suits against
them are pending in the United States. In one case, the offender has
significant assets remaining in the United States.
A. Carl Dorelien
In 1991, Jean-Bertrand Aristide was elected President of Haiti in
the country's first democratic election after years of repressive
dictatorship. A violent military coup d'dtat overthrew Aristide only
seven months after he took power. For the following three years, a
repressive military regime characterized by widespread human rights
abuses governed Haiti. Carl Dordlien was a Colonel in the Armed
Forces of Haiti, and after 1992 served as its Chief of Personnel. In
these capacities, he exercised command and control over the Haitian
Armed Forces and the paramilitaries responsible for the killing and
torture of a number of Haitian civilians." In 1995, Carl Dordlien fled
to the United States and settled in Florida, where he won over $3
million in the state lottery. In 2000, a Haitian court convicted
Dor6lien in absentia for, inter alia, conspiracy and complicity in
murder, and ordered him to pay his victims 1 billion gourdes
(approximately $28 million).4 9
In early 2000, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
officials launched the "persecutor program," which authorized sweeps
of areas in which human rights abusers were known to live. The
persecutor program additionally authorized the arrest and
deportation of several foreign government and military officials °.5  A
senior INS official involved in the program stated: "The United States
is not a safe haven. You cannot commit crimes and atrocities against
48. The facts in this paragraph are taken from First Amended Complaint at 2-3,
7, Jean v. Dorelien, Case No. 03-20161 (S.D. Fl. 2003), available at <www.cja.org/
cases/Doreliendocs/HaitiAmmended.pdf> (visited Mar. 16, 2007).
49. The Center for Justice and Accountability, Background: Haiti: Carl Dordlien,
available at <www.cja.org/cases/dorelien.shtml> (visited Mar. 16, 2007).
50. Alfonso Chardy, Former Officers are Sent Back to Haiti, MIAMI HERALD, Jan.
28, 2003.
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humankind somewhere in the world and then live happily ever after
in the United States."5  Human rights activists and immigration
attorneys echoed the INS's opinion that the persecutor program
marked a positive step. 2
In 2001, the INS arrested and detained Carl Dordlien in
connection with the persecutor program. The INS charged him with
overstaying his visa, although the INS produced evidence linking him
to human rights violations.53  Dor6lien requested relief from
deportation, claiming that he would be tortured if returned to Haiti,
but both an immigration court and the Eleventh Circuit denied his
request. 4 The INS deported Dor6lien to Haiti in January 2003 and
turned him over to Haitian authorities for prosecution. Upon his
arrival, Haitian authorities jailed Dor6lien, yet released him from
prison in 2004 during another insurgency against President Aristide,
who had re-gained power. His whereabouts are currently unknown.
Three days before Dor6lien's deportation, the Center for Justice
& Accountability ("CJA") filed suit against him under the ATCA
and the Torture Victim Protection Act ("TVPA"), alleging that
Dor6lien was responsible for torture, extrajudicial killings, arbitrary
detention, cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, and crimes against
humanity. The plaintiffs in the CJA case are four Haitian citizens,
one of whom, Lexiuste Cajuste, resides in the United States.
Cajuste's feelings about Dor6lien's deportation are mixed:
People should be extradited or deported and tried in their home
country if there is a constitutional government there. If the
government is not organized, then if they are deported, there can
be chaos, like what happened with Dor6lien ... deporting someone
when the government is not strong, that will not help.55
When asked about the possibility of deporting Toto Constant,
another Haitian human rights abuser residing in the United States,
Cajuste commented:
A lot of lawyers here are for it. But there is no justice in Haiti and
51. Id.
52. Id. ("'It's a positive development,' added Ira Kurzban, a Miami immigration
lawyer who helped investigate the Raboteau massacre and who represents the
Haitian government. 'The United States must not harbor human rights violators."').
53. Id.
54. Dordlien v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 317 F.3d 1314 (11th Cir. 2003).
55. Telephonic interview with Lexiuste Cajuste, (November 26, 2005) (on file
with the author) (The interview was conducted in French and the translation is the
author's. Any discrepancies in translation are the sole responsibility of the author.).
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no chance of a fair trial. The Haitian community here in the U.S.
wants him in prison. He is a criminal and he needs to be in prison -
whether it's here or in Haiti. The Haitian community here also
wants a judgment against him, so if there can be a judgment against
him here it's better than him being a free man in Haiti. For now, if
he is deported, he may as well run for the presidency in Haiti!
There is cacophony there. He will not be in prison. We should get
him behind bars here while Haiti is unstable, because deporting
him would be better for him - he could continue his abuses. The
Haitian people in Haiti do not want him there because he will
continue to be a torturer and terrorizer of the people. If the
16government were different then the people would want him there .
CJA's suit against Dor6lien is currently on appeal to the
Eleventh Circuit. In connection with the suit, CJA obtained a court
order to transfer nearly $1 million of Dordlien's lottery winnings into
a court-supervised escrow account. The money cannot be moved
from the account without a court order. 7
B. Juan Evangelista L6pez Grijalba
In the late 1970s, a military intelligence unit of the Honduran
security forces carried out a series of abductions, extrajudicial killings,
and disappearances of suspected political subversives. This
systematic program of disappearances and political murder was
effectuated under the authority and control of Juan Evangelista
L6pez Grijalba, the former chief of the National Investigations
Directorate of the Honduran Public Security Forces and former Chief
of Intelligence for the Armed Forces Joint Staff and General Staff. 9
Despite the widespread responsibility of the Honduran Armed Forces
for human rights abuses, charges have been filed in Honduras against
military officials in only a few cases, and none of these cases have
proceeded to trial. Potential witnesses and attorneys have been
intimidated and/or killed, and perpetrators have not been identified. 6'
56. Id.
57. Center for Justice and Accountability, Background: Haiti: Carl Dorglien,
supra note 49.
58. Complaint at 42, Reyes v. Grijalba, Case No. 02-22046 (S.D. Fl. 2004),
available at <www.cja.org/cases/Grijalba-Docs/Grijalba-Complaint.html> (visited
Mar. 16, 2007).
59. Id. at 5.
60. Id.; see also VelAsquez-Rodriguez v. Honduras, Case no. 7920, Inter-Am.
C.H.R., ser. C no. 4, at 50-77 (July 1988).
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In 1998, Grijalba fled to the United States and settled in Florida.
He was arrested four years later and held for over two years in a
notorious Miami detention center. A few months after Grijalba's
arrest, CJA filed an ATCA suit against Grijalba on behalf of six
Honduran citizens. CJA also worked closely with immigration
officials on Grijalba's case, providing them with witnesses who
testified that he had been a human rights abuser.
In 2004, an immigration court ordered Grijalba deported to
Honduras.6 A senior immigration official commented: "This country
provides protection to those fleeing persecution. Persecutors who
think that they can hide in our communities need to think twice.
62
Grijalba's attorney, however, painted a more toothless image of her
client's deportation order: "Mr. L6pez Grijalba chose not to fight his
deportation anymore. He's been in prison for over two years... and
he's going home. He has no fear of going back to the country where
the United States said he tortured people. It isn't that they won. He
just gave up. 63
Upon Grijalba's arrival in Honduras, the Honduran Human
Rights Prosecutor, in the hopes of filing criminal charges against
Grijalba, asked him to testify at a hearing. Grijalba shielded himself
from making self-incriminating statements under Honduran
constitutional law and was freed. In May 2006, Grijalba's ATCA suit
resulted in a verdict finding him responsible for torture, extrajudicial
killings, and disappearances, and awarding $47 million to the
survivors of these human rights abuses and their relatives." Although
Grijalba's future in Honduras remains uncertain, the country's new
Attorney General has said that he will prosecute Grijalba and will
collaborate with CJA in developing a curriculum for the prosecution.
61. The author obtained the information in this paragraph from The Center for
Justice & Accountability, Background: Honduras: Juan L6pez Grijalba, available at
<http://www.cja.org/cases/grijalba.shtml> (visited Mar. 16 2007).
62. Alfonso Chardv, Ruling Details Torture Claims: A Judge's Deportation Order
Provides Details About Alleged Human Rights Violations by a Former Honduran
Army Officer Accused of Complicity in a 'Dirty War', MIAMI HERALD, June 20, 2004,
at lB.
63. Id.
64. The Center for Justice & Accountability, Honduran Death Squad Leader
Ordered to Pay $47 Million (April 3, 2006), available at <www.cja.org/cases/
GrijalbaNews/Grijalba-PRA4.3.06.pdf> (visited Mar. 16, 2007).
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C. Konrad Kalejs
Konrad Kalejs, a Latvian citizen, joined the Nazi-controlled
Latvian security police in 1941.65 Authorities suspected that Kalejs
worked as a prison guard during World War II in a Nazi slave camp
where Jews and Roma were tortured. Kalejs further was suspected of
having attacked and annihilated two Russian villages.66 After the war,
he fled to Australia, where he worked at a migration center, easing
the passage of other ex-Nazis into Australia. 67 Kalejs became an
Australian citizen in 1957, and two years later moved to the United
States and became a millionaire property developer.6
In 1984, the OSI identified Kalejs as a former Nazi.69 Four years
later, a U.S. immigration judge ruled that there existed "unequivocal
evidence" that he had participated in war crimes.0 The judge ordered
Kalejs deported from the United States for making
misrepresentations in his visa application, but Kalejs delayed his
deportation for six years by pursuing various appeals. After the INS
deported Kalejs to Australia, he moved to Canada, but Canadian
authorities deported him in 1997 for his participation in war crimes.
In 1999, he moved to Britain and settled in a luxury retreat home for
elderly Latvians, but returned to Australia once Jack Straw (then
British Home Secretary) announced that he would begin deportation
proceedings against Kalejs.
Latvia, under heavy criticism for not having brought a single
Nazi war criminal to trial, charged Kalejs with war crimes in 2000. An
Australian judge found that Kalejs should be extradited to Latvia to
face trial, but the 88-year-old Kalejs pursued various appeals, and
Latvia ultimately excused him from proceedings due to his ailing
health. He died in November 2001 without ever standing trial for his
human rights abuses. Mark Aarons, author of authoritative studies
on war criminals in Australia, commented that "the last Nazi [residing
65. Patrick Barkham, Konrad Kalejs: Latvian Nazi Lieutenant Who Resisted All




69. Interview with Professor Konrad Kwiet, War Crimes Historian, ABC
Australia, in Austl. (July 1, 2000), available at <www.abc.net.au/7.30/stories/
s77825.htm> (visited Mar. 16, 2007).
70. Barkham, supra note 65.
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in Australia] will die peacefully in his bed, somewhere in Australia, in
the next few years."71
IV. Deportation as Punishment
A. Traditional Theories of Punishment
The theories of retribution, rehabilitation, denunciation,
deterrence, and incapacitation seek to explain the purposes of
criminal law in the United States.72 Utilitarian justifications for
punishment look forward to the social good resulting from the
prevention of repeated crimes by individual offenders, and from
discouraging others from committing similar crimes. 73 Retributive
justifications look backwards to the need for condemnation of
criminals regardless of the greater social utility of punishment.74
The question of whether deportation of human rights offenders
constitutes punishment requires framing the act that warrants
punishment: Is deportation punishment for entering the United States
unlawfully, or is it punishment for the' perpetrator's violation of the
underlying human rights norm? In his testimony before the House
Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims regarding passage of the
Anti-Atrocity Alien Deportation Act, Representative Mark Foley
stated:
Brutal criminals who have gone on violent rampages in Haiti,
Yugoslavia and Rwanda have been able to gain entry to the United
States through the same doors that we have opened to deserving
refugees. We need to slam the door shut on these thugs and rid our
country of those who have already managed to make their way
here .75
In a hearing regarding the same bill before the Senate, Senator
Patrick Leahy remarked: "we need to lock that door to those war
criminals who seek a safe haven in the United States. And to those
71. Id.
72. See generally KATE BLOCH & KEVIN MCMUNIGAL, CRIMINAL LAW: A
CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 28-59 (Aspen 2005).
73. RAMA MANI, BEYOND RETRIBUTION: SEEKING JUSTICE IN THE SHADOWS OF
WAR 32-33 (Polity Press 2002).
74. Id.
75. Anti-Atrocity Alien Deportation Act: Hearing on H.R. 3058, Before the
Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th
Cong. (2000) (statement of Rep. Mark Foley).
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war criminals who are already here, we should promptly show them
the door out. ' 76 The rhetoric espoused by proponents of immigration
law reform focuses on punishing the act of unjustly obtaining
immigration benefits. Although the deportation policy rightly
addresses this type of unjust enrichment, the policy often serves as a
substitute for prosecution. Therefore, the punishment of deportation,
if it constitutes punishment at all, must be examined also in the
greater framework of accountability for the underlying human rights
abuses committed by the perpetrators.
The principle of retribution, or jus talionis, seeks to punish
offenders in proportion to their moral culpability. 7 By giving an
offender his "just deserts," retributivism restores the social balance
skewed by the offender's moral reprehensiveness or by the unjust
enrichment resulting from the offender's rejection of social norms.'8
The notion that deportation constitutes punishment for entering a
country and availing oneself of the benefits of residency and/or
citizenship fits squarely within a retributivist model. If the right to
immigrate to and reside in the United States requires that individuals
have complied with certain provisions of international human rights
law, then deportation of those who have not complied with such
provisions is proportional. Such a narrow framing of the context of
the underlying crime appropriately serves the notion of "an eye for an
eye, a tooth for a tooth."
However, measuring the punishment of deportation against the
underlying human rights violation committed reveals that the
punishment falls short of serving retributivist purposes. A human
rights abuser removed from the United States loses any local ties he
has formed, may lose his job, and most importantly loses the privilege
of living where he chooses. 79 Despite these losses, the denial of
comfortable living to an individual who has ordered, planned, or
76. 145 Cong. Rec. S8637 (daily ed. July 15, 1999) (statement of Sen Patrick
Leahy).
77. IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE: PART I OF THE
METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 100-102 (John Ladd trans., 1965).
78. Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Punishment, Redress, and Pardon: Theoretical and
Psychological Approaches, in IMPUNITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 15-
16 (Roht-Arriaza ed., Oxford 1995).
79. See Beth Stephens, Accountability of International Crimes: The Synergy
Between the International Criminal Court and Alternative Remedies, 21 WIS. INT'L L.J.
527, 534 (2003) (immigration proceedings that lead to deportation or loss of visas
serve as a kind of punishment, one that may have a significant impact on a deportee's
life).
[Vol. 30:3
Deportation of Human Rights Abusers
carried out the torture of large numbers of people is a mere slap on
the wrist. Furthermore, the offender may continue to seek refuge in
other countries, as evidenced in the case of Konrad Kalejs, ° making
deportation only a temporary inconvenience. The punishment,
although not insignificant, is not proportional to the crimes
committed, and therefore does not serve retributivist goals
adequately."'
The theory of incapacitation seeks to prevent future crimes by
restricting the offender's ability and opportunity to commit crimes
through measures such as incarceration. Punishing those who have
unjustly availed themselves of immigration benefits by removing
them from the country and preventing them from re-entering serves
incapacitative purposes if entry in the United States is considered the
underlying crime they committed. However, if considered as
punishment for the underlying human rights abuse, deportation can
have varying effects on an offender's ability to commit future crimes.
The initiation of deportation proceedings may result in placement of
the offender in prison-like immigration detention centers. Human
rights violators subject to deportation also have been placed in county
jails under immigration agency supervision.' Such measures serve, at
least temporarily, to incapacitate human rights offenders and, as
Lexiuste Cajuste expressed, provide some solace to survivors,
especially refugees who live alongside them in immigrant
communities.' 4 Accordingly, detention in immigration facilities may
serve more of a retributive than incapacitative purpose. It is
questionable whether a human rights offender who no longer
affiliates with the regime that supported his abuses will likely re-
offend with no infrastructure to support his actions. His incarceration
80. See discussion supra p. 115
81. See Beth Van Schaack, The Civil Enforcement of Human Rights Norms in
Domestic Courts, 6 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 295, 297 (2000) (immigration-based
measures "may ultimately prove unsatisfactory to victims because they provide only a
limited degree of punishment or accountability").
82. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, INCAPACITATION: PENAL
CONFINEMENT AND THE RESTRAINT OF CRIME 3 (1995).
83. Chardy, supra note 50, at 1B (discussing deportation of Haitian military
officers Carl Dor6lien and Herbert Valmond).
84. See discussion supra p. 118-19.("The Haitian community here in the U.S.
wants him in prison. He is a criminal and he needs to be in prison - whether it's here
or in Haiti"); see also EDWIDGE DANTICAT, THE DEW BREAKER (Knopf 2004)
(providing a narrative of the effects of living alongside a human rights abuser in an
immigrant community).
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nonetheless has value for survivors.
However, immigration-related incapacitative measures are only
temporary. Deportation of a human rights abuser to his country of
origin, even when the country intends or claims to intend to
incapacitate him, may result in his ultimate freedom. Carl Dor6lien
was returned to Haiti and now walks the streets freely and with
impunity. As Lexiuste Cajuste points out, Haitian human rights
abusers have greater opportunity to continue committing crimes in
Haiti than they did in the United States. 5 Grijalba, who spent two
years in prison awaiting final adjudication of his deportation order,
was arguably better incapacitated before his deportation than after.
Although Grijalba's situation may change, in the interim he, too,
remains a free man.
Deterrent justifications for punishment are predicated on the
notion that potential perpetrators will appreciate the consequences of
their actions and choose not to commit crimes in order to avoid
punishment. Specific deterrence serves, through the threat of
repeated punishment, to discourage an individual from re-committing
a crime.86 General deterrence serves to discourage other individuals
from committing similar crimes.87 It is questionable whether the
possibility of deportation without criminal sanctions actually deters
human rights abusers from entering the United States. Typical
deportation cases involve six or seven years of litigation once the
individual has been apprehended,' and individuals may pursue
repeated appeals to avoid deportation, as did Konrad Kalejs. 89
Human rights abusers might not believe that they will face the
consequences of entry in the United States for years or decades.
Moreover, the threat of deportation is not a particularly powerful
deterrent, given the fact that offenders such as Kalejs may
nonetheless spend decades bouncing around the globe with
85. See discussion supra p. 115 ("The Haitian people in Haiti do not want him
there because he will continue to be a torturer and terrorizer of the people").
86. See Robert Justin Lipkin, The Moral Good Theory of Punishment, 40 FLA. L.
REV. 17, 31 n.37 (1988).
87. See id. at 30 n.36.
88. David Birnbaum, Note, Denaturalization and Deportation of Nazi War
Criminals in the United States: Upholding Constitutional Principles in a Single
Proceeding, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 201, 202 n.4 (1989) (Deportation
cases in which the individual has gained U.S. citizenship require his de-naturalization
prior to his deportation, and may take up to ten years).
89. See discussion supra p. 118-19.
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impunity.90 Finally, given the number of human rights abusers
residing in the United States and the relatively few successful
deportation proceedings, a perpetrator may not believe that he ever
will be deported.9' Specific deterrence cannot, work absent clear
announcement and consistent application of the punishment. In the
case of deportation of human rights abusers for entry in the United
States, the relatively sporadic nature of punishment tends to lessen
any deterrent effect.
By measuring the deterrent effect of deportation against the
commission of the underlying human rights abuse, the possibility of
punishment as a deterrent becomes significantly weaker. A great
deal of scholarly writing has explored whether criminals tend to
engage in a cost-benefit analysis when committing crimes.92 Many
argue that punishment has a very limited deterrent effect because
criminals are incapable of deferring the commission of a crime for the
sake of escaping punishment.93 In the case of severe human rights
abuses that are recurring, systematic, and show a particularly strong
disregard for human life, deterrence is significantly less likely to work
effectively. 9'  Moreover, severe human rights abusers may be
operating with the approval of a military regime and may believe that
they are justified in their actions or immune from punishment.9 It is
90. See Lisa Hoffman, Where are They Now: Former Bloody Dictators, SCRIPPS
HOWARD NEWS SERVICE, Jan. 25, 2003, available at <www.shns.com/shns/
g-index2.cfm?action=detail&pk=IRAQ-DICTATORBOX-01-23-03> (visited Mar.
16, 2007) (discussing cases in which human rights abusers have been given safe haven
in foreign countries).
91. As of October 2005, the estimated number of human rights abusers residing
in the United States was as high as 1,100. Report of U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, supra note 41. However, only 57 human rights abusers have been
deported from the United States for their participation in Nazi war crimes. Former
WWII Death Camp Nazi-SS Guard Arrested. Report of U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, supra note 42. Recent immigration sweeps in Florida under
the persecutor program resulted, collectively, in the apprehension of 21 individuals
(not all of whom were deported), but as many as 150 human rights abusers are
suspected to be hiding in Florida. United States of America: A Safe Haven for
Torturers, supra note 11, at 23-25.
92. See, e.g, John J. Dilulio, Jr., Help Wanted: Economists, Crime and Public
Policy, 10 J. OF ECON. PERSPECTIVES 3, 16-17 (Winter 1996).
93. See id.
94. See David Wippman, Atrocities, Deterrence, and the Limits of International
Justice, 23 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 473, 488 (1999) (arguing that deterrent effect of
punishments for human rights violations "seems likely to be modest and incremental,
rather than dramatic and transformative").
95. See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 78, at 14-15.
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questionable whether even the threat of prosecution serves to deter
human rights abusers.' Therefore, the more benign threat of
deportation, or even the possibility that the individual will not be
welcome in most parts of the world, seems unlikely to deter him from
committing human rights abuses.
The theory of denunciation focuses on the greater social utility of
punishment, holding that society reaffirms its values by registering
public disapproval of those who contradict them.' Denunciation
serves to demonstrate that social rules, and society itself, "work." 98
The United States' deportation policy certainly has been couched in
denunciatory rhetoric. James Goldman, assistant director of
investigations for the Miami district office of the former Immigration
and Naturalization Service, announced that the government's
persecutor program, which conducted sweeps of regions in which
human rights abusers tend to hide, sent the message that the United
States is not a safe haven: "[y]ou cannot commit crimes and atrocities
against humankind somewhere in the world and then live happily
ever after in the United States."' Immigration officials and legislators
repeatedly have agreed that the removal of human rights abusers
from the United States serves to announce that our communities do
not welcome these individuals."
However, the problem of framing the perpetrator's underlying
act remains: the United States very well may denounce an individual
for entering its territory, but without ensuring that further action is
taken against the perpetrator, such acts of denunciation become less
meaningful. Denunciation must "increase social satisfaction with a
just scheme of punishment, thus increasing social cohesion. ''°
Because community norms form the basis for denunciation, in the
case of deportation one must consider the community whose norms
are to be affirmed. If viewed through the eyes of the citizens of the
country into which the perpetrator has fled, deportation is likely to
denounce wrongdoers adequately: Americans might rest assured
knowing that their neighborhoods do not harbor torturers, and
96. See generally Wippman, supra note 94.
97. Ronald J. Rychlak, Society's Moral Right to Punish: A Further Exploration of
the Denunciation Theory of Punishment, 65 TUL. L. REV. 299, 331 (1990).
98. Id. at 332.
99. Chardy, supra note 50.
100. See supra notes 51, 52, 62, 75, and 76.
101. Roht-Arriaza, supra note 78, at 17; see also Aceves & Hoffman, supra note 46
(critiquing the adequacy of immigration restrictions on human rights abusers).
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therefore may be satisfied with deportation of human rights
offenders."°
Well-accepted international human rights norms, such as the
proscriptions of torture and genocide, incorporate the notion that the
offender's act shows such disregard for humanity that it must be
punished as a crime against all of mankind.1 3 Thus, the denunciatory
effect of deportation also must be assessed from the perspective of
international community at large and the community of survivors. As
Lexiuste Cajuste points out, deporting a perpetrator because of his
human rights abuses has an appreciable impact on survivors: "if
someone is deported as a criminal ... then you are recognizing what
the person did, and it means something to the plaintiffs [in an ATCA
case]."' '  Revealing the identity of a human rights abuser and
announcing that society does not welcome his presence serves to
affirm society's intolerance of his actions.' However, freeing the
individual in his home country may diminish the impact of
deportationY°6 Without some other means of holding the offender
accountable, deportation alone does not seem "severe enough to
make the intended point ' or to affirm the international community's
belief that certain human rights violations should not go unpunished.
102. The rhetoric surrounding the passage of the IRTPA, which focused heavily
on the importance of not harboring or welcoming human rights abusers in American
communities, illustrates that both members of Congress and their constituents found
these justifications for the IRTPA compelling. See discussion supra pp. 5-12.
103. See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980) ("In the
modern age, humanitarian and practical considerations have combined to lead the
nations of the world to recognize that respect for fundamental human rights is in
their individual and collective interest. Among the rights universally proclaimed by
all nations, as we have noted, is the right to be free of physical torture. Indeed, for
purposes of civil liability, the torturer has become like the pirate and slave trader
before him hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind").
104. Interview with Lexiuste Cajuste, supra note 55.
105. See Colloquium, Developments in the Law, International Criminal Law: The
Promises of International Prosecution, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1957, 1962 (2001) (noting
that the stigma associated with being identified as a rights abuser can discredit
individuals and undermine their political influence); see also Ellen Lutz & Kathryn
Sikkink, The Justice Cascade: The Evolution and Impact of Foreign Human Rights
Trials in Latin America, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 1, 4 ("Even cases like Pinochet, in which a
foreign court recognized the legitimacy of a third country's jurisdiction but ultimately
did not take steps to ensure the trial of the perpetrator, can be seen as norm-
affirming events").
106. See discussion supra p. 115 ("He is a criminal and he needs to be in prison -
whether it's here or in Haiti ... if there can be a judgment against him here it's better
than him being a free man in Haiti").
107. Id.
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Finally, rehabilitative theories of punishment seek to educate the
offender and ultimately re-integrate him into society."
Rehabilitation of human rights offenders calls for reforming attitudes
that are "deliberately inculcated in an institutional setting," requiring
both the investment of significant resources into institutional reform
and the political will to undertake such reform.' 9 Rather than re-
assimilating the offender into society, deportation of human rights
abusers simply expels him back into his country of origin and thus
does not serve rehabilitative purposes.
V. Nexus: A Workable Deportation Scheme
A. Deportation Should Function Alongside Other Forms of
Punishment
When examined in light of traditional theories of punishment,
although deportation of human rights offenders seems to punish
adequately the act of entering the United States illegally, it often does
little to achieve accountability for the underlying human rights abuse.
Human rights advocates have expressed concern with a scheme of
punishment focusing solely on immigration restrictions. As one
commentator noted, "[d]eportation is relocation of the criminal but
not punishment of the crime. A person who comes... and then is
told to move on has received a temporary haven and then a
temporary inconvenience.'"' Scholars have expressed particular
concern with the potential impunity resulting from deportation:
"deportation does not serve as an effective policy. At best it provides
an inconvenience to torturers. At worst, it provides immunity to
torturers by returning them to countries where they will not be
prosecuted."'"2  Thus, as in Canada, deportation should exist
108. See Rychlak, supra note 97, at 311.
109. Roht-Arriaza, supra note 78, at 15.
110. Immigration Relief under the Convention Against Torture for Serious
Criminals and Human Rights Violators: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on
Immigration, Border Security and Claims, House Committee on the Judiciary, at § 6
(July 11, 2003) (Testimony of Amnesty International USA) ("Immigration law
restrictions against alleged torturers are not sufficient for fighting impunity").
111. David Matas, Canada as a Haven for Torturers, Remarks at the Centre for
Refugee Studies (Feb. 29, 2000), available at <www.ccvt.org/pdfs/firtlight-issue-
2000_spring.pdf>.
112. William J. Aceves, Prosecuting Torture in U.S. Courts: The Inapplicability of
the Ex Post Facto Defense, in EFFECTIVE STRATEGIES FOR PROTECTING HUMAN
RIGHTS 148 (David Barnhizer, ed., 2001).
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alongside a larger scheme of punishment that ultimately seeks some
form of accountability.
The effect of deportation as punishment for one's status of
human-rights-abuser-cum-illegal-immigrant, and not for the
commission of the underlying human rights abuse, was obvious to
proponents of immigration legislation allowing for such
deportations."' Representative Mark Foley aptly pointed out the
limitations of deportation as punishment when he analogized the
need for such legislative changes to the need for Megan's Law, which
discloses to the public the identity of sex offenders. "4 Registration
requirements such as Megan's Law are not intended to be punitive.
Such regulations primarily constitute civil sanctions designed to
protect the public. However, individuals subject to such laws must
nonetheless be punished for their underlying acts. " The Supreme
Court has long held that deportation is not punishment,"6 and Federal
Courts of Appeal have echoed this finding in the context of human
rights-related abuses.
11 7
i. Extradition or Prosecution
The United States has recognized that certain human rights
abuses require punishment. The United States has ratified the
113. See supra pp. 120-21.
114. Anti-Atrocity Alien Deportation Act, statement of Rep. Mark Foley, supra
note 75.
115. See, e.g., Lanni v. Engler, 994 F. Supp. 849, 852-853 (D. Mich. 1998).
116. Bugajewitz v. Adams, supra note 4, at 591 (the determination that a non-
citizen is an undesirable person "is not a conviction of a crime, nor is the deportation
a punishment; it is simply a refusal by the Government to harbor persons whom it
does not want"); Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 39 (1924) ("It is well settled that
deportation, while it may be burdensome and severe for the alien, is not
punishment").
117. See, e.g., Linnas v. INS, 790 F.2d 1024, 1030 (2d Cir. 1986) ("[D]eportation,
although often severely burdensome, is not punishment .... Deportation furthers
the non-punitive legislative purpose of protecting the citizenry from persons harmful
to the public good. In the case of Nazi persecutors, it borders on sophistry to deny
the legitimate legislative purposes of excluding known mass murderers from the
United States. It was certainly reasonable for the citizens of the United States,
through their elected representatives, to conclude that they did not wish to share
their communities with persons who ordered the wholesale extermination of innocent
men, women and children. It is also reasonable for the United States, apart from any
punitive intent, to wish not to be known in the family of civilized nations as a haven
for the refuse of the Nazi abomination"); Artukovic v. INS, 693 F.2d 894, 897 (9th
Cir. 1982) ("Deportation, however, is not a punishment; it is simply a refusal by the
government to harbor persons whom it does not wish to harbor").
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Genocide Convention and has undertaken to "prevent and punish"
the crime of genocide."8  By ratifying the Convention Against
Torture, the United States has undertaken the duty to extradite or
prosecute alleged torturers (aut dedere aut judicare),"9 and has made
clear that anything short of extradition or prosecution constitutes an
inadequate means of addressing the problem of torture. When it
passed the IRTPA, Congress intended for immigration officials to
weigh the possibility of extradition and prosecution in deciding
whether to deport a human rights offender:
The Attorney General shall consult with the Secretary of
Homeland Security in making determinations concerning the
criminal prosecution or extradition of aliens described in [the
IRTPA] ... consideration shall be given to (A) the availability of
criminal prosecution under the laws of the United States for any
conduct that may form the basis for removal and denaturalization;
or (B) the availability of extradition of the alien to a foreign
jurisdiction that is prepared to undertake a prosecution for such
conduct. °
Thus, Congress has distinguished immigration-based punishment
for torture from previous legislation concerning genocide and Nazi
war crimes by recognizing the importance of prosecution and
extradition as means of achieving accountability.
Given the passage of the IRTPA last year, it has become likely
that the government will initiate torture-based deportation
proceedings in the near future. When it does, human rights advocates
should voice their concerns that simply deporting torturers without
seeking prosecution or extradition eviscerates the principle of aut
dedere aut judicare. The United States has criminalized torture
committed abroad in order to implement its obligations under the
Convention Against Torture.' Human rights advocates should
encourage government officials to prosecute torturers, particularly in
cases with favorable facts likely to result in a conviction.
The United States has demonstrated some reluctance to
prosecute individuals for extraterritorial torture by bringing only one
118. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 78
U.N.T.S. 278, Art. 1, 4 (Dec. 9, 1948).
119. Convention Against Torture, supra note 22.
120. 8 U.S.C. § 1103(h) (2005).
121. 18 U.S.C. § 2340A (2005).
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such case since the passage of the torture statute. If the government
decides not to prosecute an offender for torture, this decision can be
used as a lever to encourage efforts to seek the individual's
extradition. Given the IRTPA's clear mandate that the Attorney
General and Secretary of Homeland Security consider the possibility
of extradition or prosecution,' 23 a decision not to prosecute should be
used to put pressure on officials to seek out extradition.
Extradition, which promises that the offender will at least stand
trial somewhere, is a more potent tool than deportation alone.
Ideally, the U.S. government, like Canada's, would work with officials
in other countries to ensure extradition, and not only deportation, of
offenders. Although the government's efforts to date have not been
exemplary, recent changes in immigration legislation under the
IRTPA may provide an avenue for change. As mandated by recent
legislation, the Attorney General has established investigatory units
"with the authority to detect and investigate, and, where appropriate,
to take legal action to denaturalize" torturers.' 2' Given the infancy of
the HRVPSU and HRLD, human rights advocates, who have a
history of collaboration with immigration officials in the investigation
and deportation of human rights abusers,'25 should form ties with and
work alongside the new investigations office to ensure the extradition
of human rights abusers.
Despite the unwillingness of the United States government to
seek out alternatives to deportation, human rights advocates can
replicate the efforts of the Canadian War Crimes Program, which
collaborates with foreign governments to seek extradition of human
rights abusers,'126 by encouraging foreign countries to request
extradition of torturers. In the case of Konrad Kalejs, international
122. See Chuckie Taylor, supra note 3; Aceves & Hoffman, supra note 101, at 737;
Peter Margulies, Democratic Transitions and the Future of Asylum Law, 71 U. COLO.
L. REV. 3, 33-34 (2000); Youngers, supra note 3, at 5 (criticizing the United States'
reluctance to prosecute human rights abusers).
123. 8 U.S.C. § 1103(h) (2005) ("The Attorney General shall consult with the
Secretary of Homeland Security in making determinations concerning the criminal
prosecution or extradition of aliens described in [the IRTPA] ... consideration shall
be given to... the availability of extradition of the alien to a foreign jurisdiction that
is prepared to undertake a prosecution for such conduct").
124. 8 U.S.C. § 1103(h)(1) (2005).
125. See The Center for Justice & Accountability, Projects: Deportations, supra note
47; see also Report of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, supra note 41.
126. CANADA'S WAR CRIMES PROGRAM: ANNUAL REPORT 1998-1999, supra note 31.
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pressure ultimately drove Latvia to request Kalej's extradition.' 27
Although the request was made too late, Kalejs's case, which almost
resulted in accountability, illustrates the importance of strategy and
timing in bringing human rights violators to justice. Collaboration
should begin with efforts to ensure prosecution in the offender's
country of origin. If the home country will not provide an adequate
forum for prosecution of the offender, then advocates should consider
whether third countries, particularly countries with well-developed
universal jurisdiction statutes, can be encouraged to request
extradition.
In pursuing extradition rather than deportation with no promise
of trial, advocates should weigh potential obstacles to extradition.
They should consider the political responses of the United States and
third countries to such requests. The recent controversy over the
extradition of Luis Posada Carriles, a Venezuelan intelligence agent
and former CIA operative accused of masterminding the bombing of
a Cubana de Aviaci6n flight that killed 73 people, illustrates the
political factors that may interfere with extradition." Despite
Venezuela's request that Carriles be extradited to stand trial for the
bombing, and despite a Unites States-Venezuela treaty obligation to
extradite individuals charged with murder, 129 a federal judge ruled
that Carriles cannot be sent to Venezuela or Cuba.'" The decision
has been criticized widely as a maneuver to protect a former
government operative who played a key role in the Iran-Contra affair
and claims to have saved the U.S. government "a lot of
embarrassment and scandal.'
131
Even when it is not acting to protect itself, the government has
been criticized for the apparent bias of its immigration decisions. 
32
For example, studies of asylum decisions have found high grant rates
127. Barkham, supra note 65.
128. Jim Defede, Family Haunted by Fugitive's Bid for U.S. Asylum, MIAMI
HERALD, April 24, 2005.
129. The Center for Justice & Accountability, Background: Venezuela: Luis
Posada Carriles, available at <www.cja.org/cases/Carriles.shtml> (visited Mar. 16,
2007).
130. National Briefing: Judge Bars Deportation of Exile, THE N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28,
2005, at A22.
131. Terrorist Cuban Exile Luis Posada Carriles Seeking Political Asylum in U.S.,
interview with Ann Louise Bardach, Democracy Now! (May 9, 2005), available at
<www.democracynow.orgarticle.pl?sid=05/05/09/148243> (visited Mar. 16, 2007).
132. David A. Martin, Reforming Asylum Adjudication: On Navigating the Coast
of Bohemia, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1247, 1331-32 (1990).
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for applicants from communist countries and strikingly low rates for
applicants from El Salvador and Guatemala. 33  The State
Department, which has the right to provide advisory letters in all
cases before immigration courts, often allows political considerations
to intrude on what should be neutral decisionmaking."'
Advocates should take into account these political considerations
when attempting to seek an individual's extradition. The first
deportation cases brought under the IRTPA will provide the
opportunity to request that the government seek out extradition
rather than deportation. Decisions to make such requests should be
reached with an eye to finding appropriate "test" cases in which the
United States' political bias is less likely to interfere with extradition.
In evaluating whether to encourage extradition of a human rights
abuser to a third country, advocates should consider whether
extradition will over-burden the country's court system."' They
should appreciate the evidence and witnesses that would be before
the court, the number of extraterritorial cases previously and
currently before the court, and the potential impact on local jurors, if
applicable. 36 Finally, if requesting extradition to a third country,
advocates must ensure that the individual will receive a fair trial and
will not be subject to the death penalty, torture, or cruel, inhuman,
133. Id. at 1331.
134. Michael Posner, Comments and Recommendations on Proposed Reforms to
United States Immigration Policy, 36 U. MIAMI L. REV. 883, 887 (1982) ("[O]ne of the
most troubling problems with the current immigration system is the State
Department's involvement in the decisionmaking process"); see also Youngers, supra
note 3, at 5 (discussing State Department's intervention to prevent torture
prosecution).
135. For example, Belgium's universal jurisdiction laws, which before their recent
reform were extremely receptive to jurisdiction for extraterritorial crimes, led to
overburdening of Belgian courts and the perception that Belgium was "the world's
court system for human rights litigation." Monica Hans, Providing for Uniformity in
the Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction: Can Either the Princeton Principles on
Universal Jurisdiction or an International Criminal Court Accomplish These Goals?,
15 TRANSNAT'L LAW 357, 374 (2002); see also Deena R. Hurwitz, Lawyering for
Justice and the Inevitability of International Human Rights Clinics, 28 YALE J. INT'L L.
505, 515 n.37 (2003) (Germany's universal jurisdiction statute gives the government
discretion not to pursue cases which will over-burden its court system).
136. The U.S. Supreme Court's analysis of "public interest factors" in forum non
conveniens determinations is instructive. In deciding whether to dismiss litigation in
domestic courts in favor of litigation in foreign courts, courts consider the potential
congestion of foreign courts and the potential undue burden on foreign jurors. Gulf
Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1947).
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and degrading treatment or punishment.'37
ii. Civil Suits
If extradition is not possible, civil suits in the United States under
the ATCA or TVPA provide a means of achieving accountability,
especially if the offender will leave behind assets in the United States.
Indeed, a notable difference between the Grijalba and Dordlien cases
is that although both men returned to their home countries, Carl
Dorflien's lottery winnings remained in the United States. Thus,
despite Dordlien's deportation, survivors may still recover a large
quantity of his money. If deportation of a human rights abuser is on
the horizon, human rights advocates should investigate whether the
individual has assets in the United States. If he does, and if a civil suit
can be filed against him, his assets should be attached before his
deportation.'
The procedure for attaching assets is a question of state law, but
nearly every state requires either a pre-attachment hearing, a showing
of some exigent circumstance, or both, before permitting an
attachment to take place.'39 Litigants requesting the attachment of an
offender's assets should be prepared to argue that the offender's
impending deportation presents a substantial risk that his assets will
disappear along with him. Furthermore, such litigants may be
required to show probable cause that judgment in the civil suit would
be rendered in favor of the plaintiff.' °
The attachment of a deportee's assets is a powerful symbol for
survivors. Although the offender is no longer in the United States, a
significant "part" of him remains: his money. This money has been
"taken" from the offender, at least temporarily, by court order.
Because the money will be used to compensate survivors upon
success in their civil suit, deportation of the human rights abuser after
attachment of assets provides a stronger means of achieving
accountability than deportation alone.
137. For a more detailed discussion of the safeguards that should be provided to
deportees, see discussion supra p. 381.
138. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 64.
139. Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1991).
140. Id. at 16-19.
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B. Offenders Should Be Deported on the Grounds of Human Rights
Abuses and Not Immigration Violations
As discussed herein, restrictions on immigration benefits to
human rights abusers have some punitive effect even in the absence
of prosecution, particularly to the extent that they publicly denounce
the offender. One commentator noted that such restrictions "impose
a more subtle form of moral compensation" for survivors,141 and
torture survivor Lexiuste Cajuste noted the impact of public
recognition stemming from deportation on criminal grounds.142
However, Cajuste also pointed out that deportation of human rights
abusers on immigration-violation technicalities does not carry similar
weight for survivors: "if someone is deported on the basis of illegal
citizenship, there is really no impact.'
143
Particularly when deportation may be the only means of
punishing a human rights abuser, the grounds on which immigration
officials seek to deport the abuser become significant. In the past,
immigration officials have relied on immigration law technicalities
and visa violations to deport suspected human rights offenders
because of the relative ease of bringing these types of deportation
cases.'" As of July 2003, only 71 Nazi persecutors had been stripped
of U.S. citizenship under the Holtzman Amendment, and only 57 of
these individuals had been removed from the United States.' 5 Only
one individual ever has been placed in deportation proceedings for
his participation in genocide.' 6
Because deportation proceedings are frequently closed 14 7 and
141. William J. Aceves, Liberalism and International Legal Scholarship: The
Pinochet Case and the Move Toward a Universal System of Transnational Law
Litigation, 41 HARV. INT'L L.J. 129, 147-50 (2000) (describing denial of immigration
relief as "a third form of transnational law litigation" which to some extent
accomplishes goals of retribution, deterrence and redress).
142. Interview with Lexiuste Cajuste, supra note 55 ("If someone is deported as a
criminal ... then you are recognizing what the person did, and it means something to
the plaintiffs [in an ATCA case]").
143. Id.
144. Del Quentin Wilber, Rights Abusers Can Find Haven: U.S. Immigration Law
Enables Torturers to Enter, Stay Safely, BALT. SUN, Aug. 28, 2000, at 5A.
145. Former WWII Death Camp Nazi-SS Guard Arrested, supra note 42.
146. Report of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, supra note 41.
147. Immigration judges have the discretion to close deportation proceedings to
the public for various reasons, including the protection of witnesses. If the
government decides that the content of a deportation hearing may pose a threat to
national security, the immigration judge is required to defer to the government's
finding and close the proceedings. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.27 (2005). Furthermore, if a
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because immigration officials have refused to comment on
technicality-based deportations, '48 human rights abusers often return
quietly to their home countries without public denunciation. For
example, although the persecutor program led to the investigation
and arrest of Carl Dor6lien, he initially only faced charges for a visa
violation.' 9 When he appealed his deportation and sought relief from
removal on the grounds that he would be tortured, the Eleventh
Circuit denied him relief for procedural reasons." Although the
Eleventh Circuit's opinion mentioned Dor6lien's alleged role in
human rights abuses, the court did not predicate its decision on these
grounds.'
In contrast, although the persecutor program also led to the
arrest of Juan Evangelista L6pez Grijalba, his deportation ultimately
rested on grounds that he misrepresented his criminal history in his
application for temporary protected status. Although various
witnesses testified in his deportation proceedings, the proceedings
were closed to the public.'52 However, because his deportation bore
some relation to his human rights abuses, it served a greater
denunciatory purpose than Dor6lien's deportation, which did not
have as powerful of an impact on survivors.'53
Before the passage of the IRTPA, investigative units of the
Department of Justice relying on technicalities to deport offenders
expressed the need for human rights-violation-based grounds on
which to deport human rights abusers. Associate Deputy Attorney
General James Castello noted that "the present state of immigration
law does not provide the INS with the necessary tools to remove
individuals from the United States, even when they have allegedly
committed acts considered to be atrocious human rights abuses. '
human rights offender applies for asylum or withholding of removal on the grounds
that he will be tortured if returned to his home country, he may request that the
hearing be closed to the public. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.11 (2005). For a discussion of the
dangers of closed deportation hearings, see Michael Scaperlanda, Are We That Far
Gone?: Due Process and Secret Deportation Hearings, 7 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 23
(1996).
148. Scaperlanda, supra note 147.
149. Chardy, supra note 50.
150. Dor6lien v. U.S. Atty. Gen., supra note 54.
151. Id.
152. In Re Juan Evangelista L6pez a.k.a. Juan Evangelista L6pez-Grijalba, no.
A94 265 485 (BIA 2003).
153. See Interview with Lexiuste Cajuste, supra note 55.
154. Adopted Orphans Citizenship Act and Anti-Atrocity Alien Deportation Act:
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Now that immigration law has expanded with the passage of the
IRTPA, the strongest argument against deporting individuals on
human-rights-related grounds is that doing so requires more
investigation and collection of evidence than the relatively easier
alternative, reliance on immigration technicalities. However, the
United States government specifically has allotted resources to the
investigation of human rights abusers '55 and has stressed the
importance of programs aimed at bringing human rights offenders to
justice.156 Although these programs are still in their infancy, their
promise lies in the recent creation of new investigative units to work
towards deportation of human rights abuses.
In addition, human rights attorneys often have assisted
immigration officials with the deportation of human rights abusers. '57
The investigative unit that formerly tracked down human rights
abusers recognized CJA, which has provided immigration officials
with information in a number of deportation cases, as "the most
useful NGO" in helping its work. Furthermore, a training video
features CJA as the main NGO for field agents to contact in
connection with cases against suspected abusers. 158  Similarly,
advocates should develop a relationship with the HRVPSU and
HRDL, the offices that have been tasked with implementing
deportation and possible prosecution under the IRTPA. To the
extent that they can, advocates should offer to provide investigators
with witnesses and evidence, thereby helping to alleviate the burden
of such investigations.
In order to ensure that deportation carries as much punitive
weight as possible, human rights advocates collaborating with
immigration authorities should request that offenders be deported on
grounds of their participation in human rights abuses. Advocates
should use the information available to them to help immigration
officials build a case for deportation under the IRTPA or under
previous legislation allowing for deportation based on participation in
genocide.
Hearing on H.R. 2833 and H.R. 3058 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and
Claims of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 22 (2000) (statement of James
Castello, Associate Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice).
155. See 8 U.S.C. § 1103(h)(1), supra note 124.
156. See Chardy, supra notes 50, 51, 62, and 99.
157. See The Center for Justice & Accountability, Projects: Deportations, supra note
47; see also Report of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, supra note 41.
158. See Report of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, supra note 41.
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If deportation under such legislation is not possible, offenders
should be deported on grounds that most powerfully denounce their
crimes. For example, given the choice of deporting, an individual for
overstaying his visa or deporting him for having misrepresented his
status as a human rights abuser on his visa application, the latter
option, which offers some acknowledgment of the individual's
wrongdoing, is preferable. The deportation order should, to whatever
extent possible, detail the offender's history of abuses. The
deportation proceedings should be open so as to create a record of
the reason for the individual's deportation."5 Survivors should be
given the option of testifying before the court whenever possible.
Finally, advocates should work with the press to ensure that such
deportations, and the reasons therefore, are publicized. Such efforts
would provide survivors with meaningful public denouncement of the
offender's activities."
C. Deportation Must Take Into Account the Political Situation in
the Offender's Home Country
In deciding whether to support the deportation of human rights
abusers, advocates should consider carefully the political situation in
the offender's home country and should collaborate with local
officials. If the individual will face trial and be brought to justice at
home, he should be deported. 16' Trying the perpetrator in his home
country, where many survivors can follow the trial and where a public
dialogue surrounding the trial may flourish, serves as an important
step in a nation's healing from human rights atrocities.'62 Advocates
should ensure the willingness of prosecutors at home to pursue the
human rights offender, and the ability to punish him adequately
159. For a discussion of the right of public access to deportation hearings, see
Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, et al., 303 F.3d 681, 703-04 (6th Cir. 2002) (open
deportation hearings have a cathartic effect, enhance the perception of judicial
integrity and fairness, and protect free discussion of government affairs, and ensure
that the government properly does its job).
160. Interview with Lexiuste Cajuste, supra note 55 ("If someone is deported as a
criminal ... then you are recognizing what the person did, and it means something to
the plaintiffs [in an ATCA case]").
161. Id. ("People should be extradited or deported and tried in their home country
if there is a constitutional government there.").
162. See Keren R. Michaeli & Orna Ben-Naftali, Justice-Ability: A Critique of the
Alleged Non-Justiciability of Israel's Policy of Targeted Killings, 1 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST.
368, 394-400 (2003) (setting forth reasons for preference of prosecution of human
rights abusers in domestic, and not international, courts).
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under local law. When possible, advocates should encourage the
home country to request the individual's extradition (if the United
States and the country are party to an extradition treaty) and to
acknowledge formally its intent to try him.
In a case in which the individual is unlikely to stand trial in his
home country, as with Toto Constant, advocates should be loath to
encourage deportation. Deportation proves particularly dangerous
when the home country's current regime is the same as the regime
under which the offender committed his crimes, when the current
regime has done nothing to denounce the offender's regime, or when
the country's government is unstable. In such cases, the offender may
re-establish ties and even perpetuate additional human rights abuses.
He risks becoming a terror to the local community. Moreover, he
may not perceive deportation as punishment, but may feel that he is
"better off" returning home than being held in an immigration
detention center in the United States. 63 In such a case, the risk of
increased harm to the local community weighs strongly against
deportation. Advocates working closely with immigration officials in
such cases might suggest that the offender be placed in United States
immigration detention facilities until the home government stabilizes
and is willing and able to prosecute the offender. Such a solution
would comply with the principle of aut dedere autjudicare.
In some cases, it is difficult to predict what will happen once an
individual returns to his home country. When Carl Dor6lien was
deported to Haiti, the regime that had supported his human rights
abuses had not been in power for 10 years. Haitians both in the
United States and in Haiti believed that Dor6lien would serve his
time once he returned home.' Dor6lien, however, may have thought
differently: When he arrived in Haiti, he did not contest his in
absentia conviction or demand a new trial, but chose to serve time in
prison. It is likely that he knew that just a year later, another coup
against Aristide would create political instability in Haiti and restore
power to many of the individuals with whom he collaborated in the
early 1990s. In the case of Haiti, 10 years of democracy following a
brutal military regime did not guarantee the return of the rule of law.
163. Interview with Lexiuste Cajuste, supra note 55 ("We should get him behind
bars here while Haiti is unstable, because deporting him would be better for him - he
could continue his abuses. The Haitian people in Haiti do not want him there
because he will continue to be a torturer and terrorizer of the people").
164. Id.
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In the case of Juan Evangelista L6pez Grijalba, human rights
advocates worked with Honduran authorities to ensure that Grijalba
would be tried at home. However, after his deportation, the
Honduran government assigned a new prosecutor to his case, who
ultimately dropped the charges against Grijalba. As a result,
Grijalba, who had been incarcerated in Miami's Krome detention
center for two years, is now a free man.65 Now that Honduras has a
new Attorney General, Grijalba's case may be revived, but his future
remains uncertain. Grijalba's deportation nonetheless had a
denunciatory effect by alerting both communities in Honduras and in
the United States to his case. His deportation allowed witnesses in
the United States to testify before an immigration judge, providing
them the opportunity to tell their stories and obtain results from their
testimony.
Ultimately, the positive effects of deportation should be weighed
against the chance that nothing will happen to the individual upon his
return home. In some cases, deportation may nonetheless be
advisable, especially when human rights advocates can work with
authorities in the offender's home country to bring the perpetrator to
justice. In making this calculus, consideration should be given to: (1)
whether the regime under which the perpetrator committed human
rights abuses is still in power, either overtly or because officials from
the offending regime are members of a new government; (2) whether
the home country's current government supports or publicly
denounces the regime under which the perpetrator committed human
rights abuses; (3) the length of time passed since the perpetrator's
regime was in power; (4) the relative political stability of the country;
(5) whether the country has an independent judiciary; (6) whether
any efforts have been made to prosecute other human rights abusers
in the home country, particularly other members of the offender's
regime; (7) whether local amnesty laws would immunize the offender
from prosecution; and (8) whether local law will likely provide
165. Background: Honduras: Juan L6pez Grijalba, supra note 61.
166. For a discussion of the inapplicability of amnesty laws to criminal-based
deportation proceedings, see Ronald C. Slye, The Legitimacy of Amnesties Under
International Law and General Principles of Anglo-American Law: Is A Legitimate
Amnesty Possible?, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 173, 219-20 (2002). For immigration decisions
refusing to give effect to foreign pardons, see Palermo v. Smith, 17 F.2d 534 (2d Cir.
1927) (denying effect of Italian pardon of murder conviction); Mullen-Cofee v. INS,
976 F.2d 1375, 1377 (11th Cir. 1992) (denying effect of Canadian pardon for narcotics
conviction).
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recourse for survivors, both in finding the offender guilty and in
punishing him appropriately.
D. Deportation Must Ensure That Offenders Receive Certain
Protections
Human rights abusers subject to deportation should nonetheless
receive certain protections. If an offender will face trial in his home
country, he should not be deported unless the proceedings comply
with international law standards governing the right to a fair trial.
The individual should be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a
competent, independent, and impartial tribunal.' He should be
presumed innocent until proven guilty.' He should be informed of
the charges against him, should be given the opportunity to prepare a
defense, and should be guaranteed the right to representation by
counsel.' 69 He should have the right to call witnesses and to examine
the witnesses against him.'70
Furthermore, authorities should not return an individual to a
country where substantial grounds exist for believing he would be in
danger of being tortured.'71 In making this determination, authorities
should give proper weight to the existence in the offender's home
country "of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations
of human rights."'72 Immigration officials should consider whether
the pattern of human rights abuses was perpetuated by the regime
under which the offender operated or whether the offender is a
member of a persecuted minority. Although compliance with the
Convention Again Torture's non-refoulement guarantee is essential,
courts should assess all of the circumstances of a particular case and
should be wary of potentially frivolous claims.'73
Finally, authorities should not deport an individual if he may be
subject to the death penalty or cruel, inhuman, or degrading
167. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature
Dec. 16, 1966, art. 14(1), 999 U.N.T.S. 171,176.
168. Id. at art. 14(2).
169. Id. at art. 14(3).
170. Id.
171. Convention Against Torture, supra note 22, at art. 3.
172. Id.
173. For example, Carl Dor6lien attempted to avail himself of the Convention
Against Torture's non-refoulement protection, but was denied protection by both an
immigration appeals court and the Eleventh Circuit. Dor6lien v. U.S. Atty. Gen.,
supra note 54.
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treatment or punishment. The United States government supports
the death penalty, and federal courts have upheld the deportation of
individuals to countries where they would face the death penalty.7 '
However, the growing trend in the international community supports
the abolition of the death penalty.175 As of April 2007, 128 countries
had abolished the death penalty in law or in practice."6 Several
international human rights instruments provide for the abolishment
or restriction of capital punishment, 7 and scholars have argued that
individuals should not be extradited without assurances that they will
not be executed.78  In accordance with the current movement in
international law, human rights advocates should not support
deportation of individuals who may be sentenced to death or
otherwise punished cruelly.
VI. Conclusion
Although deportation of a human rights abuser does not by itself
constitute adequate punishment for the atrocities he committed,
deportation serves important denunciatory purposes. Under certain
circumstances, deportation may become a means, albeit an imperfect
means, of achieving accountability. This paper has set forth a set of
guidelines or criteria for human rights advocates to consider in
evaluating whether or not to support a deportation and in deciding
the manner in which an individual should be deported.
Human rights organizations collaborating with immigration
officials in the investigation of human rights abusers should advocate
strongly for prosecution or extradition of offenders. Advocates
should work with prosecutors in the offender's home country and in
third countries to urge requests for extradition. They should
174. Linnas v. INS, supra note 117 (upholding due process and equal protection
challenges to Nazi war criminal's deportation to Soviet Union, where he had been
convicted in abstentia and sentenced to death); see also Saleh v. U.S. Dept. of Justice,
962 F.2d 234 (2d Cir. 1992) (denying withholding of deportation and asylum to citizen
of Yemen who claimed that he had been found guilty of murder and sentenced to
death in absentia by a Moslem court in Yemen).
175. See WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Cambridge Univ. Press 2d ed. 1997).
176. Facts and Figures on the Death Penalty, Amnesty Int'l (Apr. 4, 2007),
available at <web.amnesty.org/pages/deathpenalty-facts-eng>.
177. Ved P. Nanda, Bases for Refusing International Extradition Requests - Capital
Punishment and Torture, 23 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1369 (June 2000).
178. See, e.g., John Paul Truskett, The Death Penalty, International Law, and
Human Rights, 11 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 557 (2004).
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encourage immigration officials to do the same in accordance with the
principle of aut dedere aut judicare and with Congress's mandate that
immigration investigators weigh the possibilities of extradition and
prosecution of human rights offenders.
If the government does not prosecute or extradite an alleged
offender but rather seeks simply to deport him, human rights
organizations should consider whether or not to support deportation,
particularly in light of the political situation in the alleged offender's
home country and the chances that he will be brought to justice. In
order for the individual's deportation to be accompanied by some
other means of accountability, advocates should consider filing a civil
suit against the individual in U.S. courts and attaching his assets
before he leaves the country.
Once an individual is placed in deportation proceedings,
organizations should work with immigration officials to ensure that
he is deported on the grounds of his human rights violations (and not
an immigration violation such as overstaying his visa). The
deportation proceedings should be open, and survivors should be
given the opportunity to testify. The individual's deportation should
be publicized widely both in the United States and in his home
country. Finally, deportees should not be returned to a country
where they will be tortured or deprived of a fair trial, or where they
will face the death penalty or other cruel punishment.
2007]
384 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 30:3
